会议时间：2025年6月23日10:00-11:30（周一）
会议地点：明德主楼734
主讲人：温泉 华盛顿大学经济系教授
主持人：马骏副教授
主题：group rationality and group stable equilibrium
讲座简介：
in a repeated game, a strategy profile is group stable with respect to some groups of players if it is immune to deviations by any of these groups. accordingly, a subgame perfect equilibrium is stable with respect to all single-player groups. we introduce the concept of group rationality, which is an extension of individual rationality from single-player groups to multi-player groups. for a collection of groups, a group stable equilibrium outcome must be feasible and weakly group rational for these groups. on the other hand, any feasible and strictly group rational payoff vector can be supported by a group stable equilibrium when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one, a folk theorem result for group stable equilibrium.
个人简介：
温泉，华盛顿大学robert r.richards经济学教授。1991年获西安大略大学经济学博士学位。研究方向为博弈论、微观经济学理论。论文发表在econometrica,、review of economic studies, journal of economic theory、rand journal of economics、games and economic behavior、journal of mathematical economics等期刊。